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ABSTRACT

Since the fall of September, 2011, there has been a major
increase in awareness and study of global terrorism.

Academia,

the media, politicians, and the average citizen all have varying
definitions, ideas, and concerns about terrorism.
mainly been on international terrorism.

The focus has

Terrorist organizations

like Al Qaeda have permeated the discussion.

However, there is

a growing concern of the “lone wolf terrorist.”

A lone wolf

terrorist acts without a terrorist organization and is capable
of having his/her own radical agenda with the audacity and
simplicity to carry it out solely and enact great damage.

The

focus in the United States and globally has been on
international lone wolf terrorists.

This is important, but a

longstanding concern (that often goes without much conversation)
is the domestic lone wolf terrorist.

Using Gustav Freytag’s

Triangle and Rational Choice theory, it is shown that lone wolf
terrorism must be examined by the United States government to
ensure safety of its citizens.

A lone wolf terrorist is

characterized as a United States citizen who enacts a terrorist
action without being part of an organization or terror group.
His motives are extremist in nature.
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This thesis examines the

growing phenomena of the domestic lone wolf terrorist.

In doing

so, the primary function is to look at an even starker reality:
that some lone wolf terrorists have served in the military, and
during service have shown to portray radical thoughts and
actions.

Furthermore, these lone wolf terrorists used their

military training and weapon insight to enact their catastrophic
aims.

This thesis uses a case study methodology to examine

three lone wolf actors.

From the Oklahoma City Bombing, to the

1996 Olympic Summer Games in Atlanta and on to the Ft. Hood
shootings the studies find that in all cases the actors did have
radical beliefs, military training and used that training in
concert with their attacks.

This thesis can be used as a

discussion about lone wolf terrorism, but also about governance.
The findings show an increased need for the Department of
Defense to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security
and seek greater advice from organizations like the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in order to conduct better psychological
studies and examinations of military personnel.
A disclaimer must be made that this thesis does not, in any
way, seek to disparage the amazing amount of work and sacrifice
of United States government personnel and agencies.

This thesis

aims to provide research towards improved understanding and
combating of lone wolf terrorism.
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CHAPTER ONE: “LONE WOLF” TERRORISM

Department of Defense: History and Role

From the beginning of the United States of America’s
revolution towards independence, there was a growing
consolidation of forces.

Starting even in 1775, the Army, Navy

and Marine Corps. were established as organized bodies with
specific warfare purposes.

In 1789 the War Department was

created and it helped to greater establish a commonality between
the various military branches.

This consolidation continued

through the Spanish-American War, Civil War, and World War I.
Beginning in 1947, however, a true Department came to function.
This was known as the National Military Establishment
(Department of Defense, 2012).

With the newly established

Department of the Air Force and the other Departments in tow,
the size of the U.S. military had grown substantially and
consolidation was ever more needed.

This spurred the creation

of the Department of Defense in 1949.

The DOD, today, has the

various military branches reporting to a Security of Defense,

who in turn reports directly to the Commander and Chief of the
United States (Department of Defense, 2012).
This history is important to understand when it relates to
modern warfare and especially terrorism.

Much of the DOD’s

responsibility is to defend the nation, but also to wage war on
behalf of the United States.

In the modern day, war has changed

much from static battlefields to very dynamic combat zones.
What this means, is the United States no longer is able to rely
on waging war against nations and knowing where the battle may
lay.

In many cases, war is waged by generals rather than

nations, by renegades rather than those seeking nationalistic
means, and simply by terrorist organizations that seek to
subvert the status quo for their own beliefs.

Terrorist

organizations and counterterrorist pursuits are now a major
facet of the DOD.

The combat in Afghanistan, beginning at the

end of 2001, highlights how the DOD is fighting against a
terrorist organization and not a true state or nation ((ISAF
website, 2012).
It is the mission of the DOD to, “provide the military
forces needed to defer war and to protect the security of the
country” (DOD mission statement, 2012).

This is obviously a

critical mission, and as noted, modern day tactics have proved
2

to make things more difficult for the DOD.

There are currently

almost 1,200,000 persons in the U.S. military (subtracting the
Coast Guard which during domestic peacetime is a part of the
Department of Homeland Security), and that is simply active duty
(DOD personnel statistics, 2012).

The vast amount of personnel

greatly exceeds that of active duty, but the active duty number
provides a benchmark for the understanding that the DOD is
exceeding in sheer volume.

Due to this, the pressures felt by

the DOD to not only provide defense for the U.S. but to run and
maintain the Department are exponentially heavy.

U.S. Northern Command History and Role

On October 1, 2002, President Bush approved and enacted the
creation of the United States Northern Command.

The Northern

Command was created as a direct response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. The purpose of the Northern
Command was to better tighten and solidify national responses to
large-scale domestic attacks that may impact the United States
and areas surrounding the U.S. such as Mexico, Canada and air
and waterways that connect to those locations (U.S. Northern
Command, 2012).
3

The Northern Command’s mission is to “Conduct operations to
deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the
United States, its territories, and interests within the
assigned area of responsibility” (Unified Command Plan, 2002).
The Northern Command operates through a connected framework of
various military agencies.

The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine

Corp are all integral actors in sharing knowledge and combining
their trainings and preparations to thwart potential attacks.
Along with these actors, government actors ranging from Mexico
and Canada to areas controlled by the United States like Puerto
Rico and Guam are primary actors within the Command.

Besides

these large-scale actors, the Northern Command makes a concerted
effort to work with state and local law enforcement and
emergency response personnel at all times.

There is an

understanding that during a major crisis any, or even all, of
the above mentioned parties will be needed to assist, respond or
take the lead in helping to end the crisis that is taking place.

Federal Bureau of Investigation: History and Role

The Federal Bureau of Investigation began in 1910 reporting
to the Department of Justice.

The FBI’s primary mission at that
4

time was to investigate banking and bankruptcies, antitrust
cases and peonage (FBI history, 2011).

Essentially, the FBI

operated on “white collar” crimes that were the order of the
day.

But, as time pressed on, like the DOD and many other U.S.

bureaucracies, the role of the FBI grew in fashion and its
membership went from an original 34 to a present day total of
35,664 persons (FBI history, 2011). This seismic growth
correlates to the growing responsibilities of the FBI.
Like the DOD, the FBI has moved from its original
foundations within white collar crimes to investigations of all
crimes at a national level.
terrorism and terrorist aims.

Today’s FBI has a strong focus on
Again, like the DOD, the FBI has

learned to operate in a world fabric where the conventional
criminal is not the only criminal to be accounted for.

There is

the often more subtle, yet many times more harmful terrorist to
be accounted for.

The FBI works in tandem with international

agencies to mitigate and prevent international terrorism (Priest
& Akin, 2010).

The FBI also works strongly towards preventing

domestic terrorism.

To this end, beginning in 2002, the FBI

revamped its mission by strengthening “its support to federal,
county, municipal and international law enforcement partners”
(FBI history, 2012).
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Department of Homeland Security: History and Role

After the tragic events on a warm September day in 2001
occurred, and the smoke finally started to dissipate, and life
in the United States started to normalize its self, many
questions were left with very few answers.

Of the many

questions asked, one question was that of how to better protect
America from terrorist attacks.
national concern.

This became the gravest

President George W. Bush declared a “War on

Terror” and on October 7th, 2001 began military “strikes against
al Qaeda terrorist training camps” (Presidential Address to
Nation, 2001).

President Bush and leaders of Congress moved

swiftly to make better and stronger all aspects of military,
first responders, intelligence and critical infrastructures
within the United States.
To accomplish this monumental task, it became necessary to
look at creating a new department within the United States
government.

What was needed was the creation of the Department

of Homeland Security (DHS).

The idea for the DHS first began on

March 21, 2001 as a House of Representatives bill to create a
National Homeland Security Agency (H.R. 1158, 2001).
lingered around within Congress for many months.

The bill

However, after

September 11th of that year, there was no doubt in anyone’s mind
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that the need for a Homeland Security Agency was paramount and
of grave importance.

On October 8, 2001, President Bush gave

Executive Order 13228 to establish the office of Homeland
Security (EO 13228, 2001).
The Department of Homeland Security’s mission is “One Team,
One Mission, Securing Our Homeland” (DHS Strategic Plan, 2008).
This mission encompasses all facets of what DHS must do.
must secure the United States and protect the homeland.

It
It also

must be unified; it must be one team to accomplish that mission.
Presidential Directives have created a networking nexus for DHS
to collaborate with agencies and departments like the Department
of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
countless others.
The genesis of the DHS came under Homeland Security
President Directive 1.

HSPD-1 gave the organizational

capacities of the Office of Homeland Security and put over 40
federal agencies under the department’s control (HSPD-1, 2001).
Subsequent Presidential Directives gave the DHS its preverbal
teeth by giving the department its mission, objective, and legal
capabilities.
The Department continued to grow and to gain strength as
more Presidential Directives were given.
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Currently DHS has 24

Presidential Directives, providing policy guidelines and network
guidance for all facets of emergency preparedness.
This brief history highlights the creation, implementation
changes, and current features of DHS.

Though it may be a brief

history, the tasked objective and directive of the department
will ensure its existence for years to come.

National Incident Management System

As part of the DHS’s mandate to better protect the nation
from man-made and natural threats, the National Incident
Management System was created (NIMS).

NIMS is an organized

framework that has been developed to provide unified responses
to threats and incidents that might develop within the United
States and its interests.

Essentially, NIMS, “provides a

systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies
at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and
the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect
against, respond to, recover from… the effects of incidents”
(FEMA website, 2012).

NIMS, much like the U.S. Northern Command

is designed to encompass many different actors who might have
different agendas, needs, wants and priorities and to streamline
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them into one understanding so that an incident can be
prevented, minimized, and recovered from as best as possible.
The chief component of NIMS is its ability to create a
standardized language that all personnel from various
organizations and entities can learn, share, and communicate to
one another.

This is a paramount task for NIMS since, as the

definition above shows, there are many different actors that
take part in the NIMS system.

To better explain this point, the

example of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 will be used.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina besieged the Gulf region of the
United States causing massive flooding and damage to the states
of Alabama, Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana.

Katrina destroyed

many communities and cities; the most famous being New Orleans.
During the hurricane, the national government through FEMA
(Federal Emergency Management Agency) reacted to the hurricane
and sent personnel, equipment, rations and monetary aid to the
region.

However, FEMA was operating under an organized platform

that was created in 2002.

This platform included the help of

various non-profits like the American Red Cross to provide
assistance during the crisis.

Unfortunately, the Red Cross was

overwhelmed and was not able to meet the expectations given.
The Red Cross was under the assumption that it would be able to
provide short-term relief to the area by way of temporary meals
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and bedding.

FEMA expected a longer duration of help, and was

not ready to meet the needs of the victims in crisis in the
region.

This breakdown of communication caused a very dangerous

situation to escalate to the point of chaos in the area (Lipton,
et al, 2005).
There are a lot more events and underpinnings that
transpired within the events of Hurricane Katrina.

A large

number of government actors, non-profits, private actors, and
citizens played a part in the chaos that occurred.
designed to help fray the potential for that chaos.

NIMS was
NIMS

provides training and implementation standards for all groups
and persons in the United States.

The rationale is to create a

unified set of terms, definitions, and standards that all can
meet.

In so doing, the ability to prevent, respond and recover

to any event that might take place is much more highly
attainable.
As another example, one only needs to look at the findings
of the 9/11 Commission Report.

The report was commissioned to

examine the actions taken by the September 11th, 2001 terrorists
and to look at the governmental reactions.

A huge concern and

finding within the report was that not all governmental
personnel were appropriately trained and ready to act.

One

finding of the report states, “The defense of U.S. airspace on
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9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and
protocols.

It was improvised by civilians who had never handled

a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a
military unprepared for the transformation of commercial
aircraft into weapons of mass destruction” (9/11 Commission
Report, 31).

This finding is exactly what the NIMS system,

along with U.S. Northern Command and others, is designed to
prevent.

At times of catastrophe, it is of absolute necessity

that all involved are on the same page and speaking the same
language with a systematic standard of training already
completed.

Defining Governance

Governance is often difficult to define; various fields
have various definitions.

Economists, political scientists,

sociologists, business-persons, public affairs persons and a
host of other disciplines all grapple with a concrete definition
of the term (Kjaer, 2004).

It is a complex term, and one that

Americans are often unfamiliar with.

Rod Rhodes defines

governance as, “the changing boundaries between public, private
and voluntary sectors… Such networks have significant degree of
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autonomy from the state – they are self-organizing …” (Rhodes,
2007).
Although there is no set definition of governance, one
striking characteristic of the term is that it is built upon
application of government.

It is not just the type and role of

government, but how a government actually functions and most
importantly if it functions effectively.

The United States

government is a complex set of bureaucracies, agencies,
organizations, governing institutions, non-governmental
organizations, and various other actors and bodies.

Within this

complexity is the need for government agencies to be
accountable, productive, efficient and at their best.

This is

not always the case, as in the example of FEMA during Hurricane
Katrina.

For it to be the case, public and private spheres

must, as Rhodes describes above, be “self-organizing.”

As they

self-organize, they form themselves into being independent
actors whose interests are two-fold: the first being to expand
and to absorb more power and control.

The second is to

legitimize that power by producing results on the charged task
given.

Max Weber saw the harnessed capacities of a self-

organized bureaucracy.

There are the advantages of having

experts within the department, organization or bureaucracy
(Weber, 1947).
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To better illustrate what governance is, Figure 1 shows the
relationship of attributes that best define governance.

These

attributes include transparency, ethics, and accountability.
Transparency allows for those included in the department,
organization or bureaucracy to know what is happening at all
times.

Transparency also allows for other organizations and

those with vested interests to know the inner workings of the
various organizations and departments, etc.

Transparency

creates good ethical behavior.
Ethics is vastly important in governance as it is a
determining factor that an organization, department or other
entity is doing what its mandated purpose and is operating at
the maximum level that it can.

Figure 1 simplifies the

connection of transparency to ethics.

When a bureaucratic actor

is practicing transparency, they are operating under a mode of
ethics.

What this means is that, as an example, if the

Department of Education is being transparent with its national
standardized testing results by providing that information to
any persons that wants to read it, the Dept. of Education is
being ethical as well.

The ethics component comes from allowing

information to be freely disseminated to anyone that wants it,
in so doing, the Dept. of Education has been open with the
results of its findings.

Being open, or transparent, provides
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anyone with a vested interest in the Dept. of Education’s work
to have a clear understanding of what the Department is actually
doing.

In a larger scope this creates a framework for

accountability.
Lastly, accountability is what organizations and
departments need to truly determine its worth.

Accountability

is the checking of an organization by its employees, those who
are invested in it, and other organizations that must work with
it.

If an organization is ethical and is transparent, it is

much easier to hold it accountable.

As stated above, when

information is freely provided, and an organization or
bureaucracy operates with an “open-door” approach, they become
fully accountable to themselves and those they serve.

Those

within the organization are held to higher standards since they
know that their fellows have access to the work being produced.
The public that the organization serves also benefits strongly
because they are able to see the results of the organizations
operations.

In the example of the Department of Education, the

public is able to see if standardized test scores are on the
rise or decline.

Knowing if standardized test scores are on the

rise gives a concise rubric to begin assessing the Dept. of
Education’s benefit to its public.
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If the scores are not

rising, the Dept. of Education needs to examine why and explain
the results.
Within the realm of governance, the DOD, DHS and FBI have a
critical mission to accomplish.

The long version is that they

are expected to safe guard the nation in their own objectives
and capacities.

They protect against conventional, biological,

chemical, cyber and economic terrorist attacks.

The short

version, for purposes of this thesis, is that all have a role in
mitigating the threat of domestic lone wolf terrorism.

Transparency

Governance

Accountability

Equity

Figure 1: The Components of Good Governance
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Freytag’s Triangle and Rational Choice Theory

In 1863, Gustov Freytag wrote the book, Technique of Drama,
in it he featured the idea of organizing plots to create a unity
of action.
1863).

This idea he expanded upon from Aristotle (Freytag,

Freytag was writing on the principal foundations of

creating a play production.

He highlighted how a play is to be

broken up, the amount of crises to take place, and how the
action should proceed.

He also created what is now called the

Freytag Triangle (sometimes referred to as the Freytag Pyramid.)
Dr. Barbara McManus, former professor at the College of New
Rochelle, demonstrates the Freytag Triangle, as highlighted in
Figure 2 below.

The Triangle shows a Beginning, Middle and End

of action.
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Figure 2: Barbara McManus's Representation of the Freytag Pyramid

The Beginning of action is a rise in a set complication, or
problem, which the actors must recognize and begin to react to.
This stage is where persons begin to sense that something is
awry.

The arrow trends upwards showing that there is still an

apex of concern to occur and that the complication will only
become worse before better.
The second action is the Middle.
concern for the actor.

The Middle stresses upon

This is a dramatic landscape as the

crisis and complication has reached an apex.

The actor is left

to figure out what the causes of the Beginning actions were and
17

to guess or estimate the totality of what the effects will be.
The actor is still at a very vulnerable and impressionable
period during this period.
The third action is the End.
the resolution of the action.

This is typically considered

The cause/effect relationship has

shifted and the actor is left to wonder more about the causes.
The totality of effects are felt by this point and the actor is
to consider what caused the action.
Finally, there is a fourth action.

This action is typified

as a return from the End to the Beginning.

This is where the

actor has felt the effects of his actions and has recovered as
best as possible.

This is also the stage of action where the

actor starts to use what he learned from the previous action for
benefit of the next action sequence.

Basically, the actor has

gone through an action sequence and has determined what he feels
caused that action.

He now returns to the Beginning with

knowledge that may help to safeguard against another negative
action sequence of the same, or similar, consequences.

This is

the development of the actor, and it also highlights a cause and
effect relationship.

This cause and effect relationship can be

theorized by Rational Choice theory.
Max Weber, when discussing bureaucratic administration
stated, "Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the
18

exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the
feature of it which makes it specifically rational" (Weber,
1947.)

Weber is discussing three fundamental assertions here.

The first is exercise of control.

As the DOD, FBI and DHS gains

more Presidential Directives, Congressional allocations,
receives more funding, takes on more tasks and so-on the power,
or sphere, of control and influence grows greatly.
assertion is a basis of knowledge.

The second

Bureaucracies, and most top

organizations, are theoretically built around having very
knowledgeable and highly skilled employees (Weber, 954).
DOD, DHS and FBI are no different.

The

Each sub-agency of the

organizations has personnel that are at the top of their various
fields.

The third assertion is that the department,

organization or bureaucracy is a rational actor.
To assert that an actor is rational is to need to come to a
definition of what a rational actor is.

Political Scientists

and economists see rational choice as a theory describing an
actor’s cost/ benefit analysis of choices.

Sociologists define

rational choice as actions and choices that people believe are
“likely to have the best overall outcome” (Elster, 22).

The

nuances between cost/ benefit analysis and best outcomes within
rational choice theory can be either miniscule or very large
depending on the critique of the theory.
19

For the purposes of understanding the role of the DOD, FBI,
DHS, the nuances are miniscule, and act as compliments for each
other.
actors.

All three are characterized as being rational choice
Their motives are to make critical decisions within a

cost/benefit landscape.

These decisions are reflected in

organizational change, directive establishment, and within dayto-day operations in dealing with crises.

They are also

rational in that they continually seek options that will have
that best overall outcome.

This is a standard observance within

a rational choice actor.
It is of critical importance to note that these
bureaucracies of government function as rational actors to
understand the total scope of their obligations.

The

preparation, response, and recovery efforts to best protect over
nearly four hundred million people are as large and noble a task
as any can be.

And as rational choice actors, when crises,

emergencies, disasters and dangers change and morph, all must be
prepared and ever-ready to meet them head-on.

20

Defining Terrorism

Terrorism, typically international terrorism (the one that
is highlighted by the media and brings about the strongest
images and responses) is in its self very difficult to define.
The League of Nations, in 1937, attempted to defines terrorism
as, “all criminal acts directed against a state and intended or
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of
particular persons or a group of persons or the general public
(Acharya, 2009).

Since that initial modern attempt at defining

the term, other state and trans-national actors have provided
definitions.

The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as,

“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine state agents” (USDOS, 2005).

The Department of

Defense defines the term as, “the unlawful use of violence or
threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or
societies.

Terrorism is often motivated by religious,

political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the
pursuit of goals that are usually political” (DOD Dictionary of
Military Terms, 2012).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

defines the term as, “The unlawful use of force or violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
21

Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI Terms,
2012).

Lastly, some international organizations, specifically

the United Nations avoids defining terrorism all together in
that the various nations of the organization cannot agree on a
solidified term (United Nations General Assembly, 2005).
As the various definitions show, there are softened nuances
to each definition, but all hold key ideas.

Terrorism, for

purposes of this paper, is: a violent action taken by a nongovernmental actor(s) in attempts to scare a person or populous
in the hopes of enacting the perpetrators own political,
religious or social radicalized ideology.

What this means is

that a terrorist group, organization, actor, or “cell” has a
desire to invoke a change within an organization or government
and attempts to accomplish this goal by afflicting violence
(physical, emotional, psychological) on a person or groups of
persons.

Terrorism can be chiefly characterized as

Machiavellian, as the “ends justify the means.”

Unfortunately,

too often, and partially due to the lack of a concrete
definition of the term, terrorism becomes defined like Associate
Justice Potter Stewart defined pornography: one simply knows it
when they see it.

This often leads to a grave misidentification
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and becomes worse as terrorism is parceled into smaller segments
like domestic, international, lone wolf, and the like.
The United States international terrorism focus is on
groups like Al Qaeda, The Armed Islamic Group, Columbia’s
National Liberation Army, Egypt’s Al-Jihad, and countless
others.

The Center for Defense Information (under the banner of

the World Security Institute) produces an updated list of
terrorist groups periodically.

This list includes well over 100

organizations and separates them by the country of origin while
providing insight like Operational Locations, Affiliations, and
Comments (World Security Institute, 2012).
Domestically, terrorism has not received the same
attention.

There could be various reasons for this which might

include less domestic terrorist groups in the United States,
domestic terrorism is more easily thwarted, or it could be
partially caused by a misunderstanding of definitions.
Typically domestic terrorists have been defined by groups like
The Weatherman whose sensationalized radical behavior and
bombings of government infrastructures dominated headlines and
provided the grassroots for a radicalized agenda of terrorism in
America (Berger, 2006).

Also, The Black Liberation Army had an

agenda as being to “take up arms for the liberation and selfdetermination of black people in the United States” (START.UMD,
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2012).

These groups, along with the Klu Klux Klan and others,

created an era in the late 1960’s until the late 1970’s that saw
a rise in domestic terrorism.

International terrorism still

trumped, but an era of fear due to terrorism, assassination,
riots, and mass killings helped to redefine the terminology used
to describe terrorism.
Since that time, domestic terrorism seemed to wane.

David

Koresh and the Waco siege in 1993 stood out as domestic
terrorist group activity, but for the most part United States
domestic terrorism seemed silent in the last thirty years.
Silent in the sense that political, media, and civilian
attention remained low.

However, this truly is not the case as

domestic terrorism has been strongly dominated by a force that
is difficult to define.

Domestic terrorism has been dominated

by the “lone wolf” terrorist.

Lone Wolf Terrorism

Lone wolf terrorism has caused a grave amount of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic damage in the United
States.

A lone wolf terrorist's agendas is the same as

traditional terrorist organizations.
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He, or she, uses violence

as a means to evoke change in a government, organization, or
group of people.

The paramount difference is that lone wolf

terrorists act solely, or by aid of only two or three people, to
accomplish their actions.

This makes the lone wolf much more

difficult to find and much more difficult to prevent.

Any

person with a radicalized agenda who wants to evoke change by
violent means has potential to do so.

Janet Napolitano,

security of Homeland Security, recently stated that lone wolves,
“were harder to detect in part because by their very definition,
they’re not conspiring with others, they may not be
communicating with others, there’s very little to indicate that
something is under way” (Washington Examiner, 2012).

Lone wolf

terrorists create a growing threat to the United States.
A simplified model of the various organizations that are
involved in protecting against, preparing for, and responding to
lone wolf terrorism is shown in Figure 3 below.
is the individualized lone wolf terrorist actor.

In the center
Circled around

the terrorist are federal departments and agencies, state and
local agencies and private organizations.

The chief federal

departments and agencies include the Department of Defense,
Department of Homeland Security, the State Department and the
Federal Bureau of Intelligence.

The state and local agencies

include police and intelligence agencies, emergency response
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agencies and various other actors that are directly and
indirectly affected by a terrorist threat and/or attack.
private organizations are included.

Also,

Private organizations

include non-profits like the Red Cross and Salvation Army,
private contractors and businesses, hospitals and others.
Justice

Department of
Defense

Department of
State

State and
Local Agencies

Lone Wolf
Terrorism
Federal
Bureau of
Investigation

Private
Organizations
Department of
Homeland
Security

Figure 3: Direct Actors in Relationship to Lone Wolf Terrorism

Increasing this threat is the potential of lone wolf
terrorists to be anyone within society.

With no formal

connection or affiliation that provides directive for their
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actions, a lone wolf terrorist could be anyone (Vollers, 2006).
The threat becomes even more severe when there is potential that
these terrorists may be found in different governmental
positions, high security positions, or even the U.S. military.
The last of these is very dangerous as warfare techniques,
weaponry uses, retaliation methods, etc. are all at the
terrorist’s disposal for learning and future use.

Research Methodology

The original perspective for this thesis was to look at
various U.S. government agencies and their roles in combating
global terrorism.

The purpose of the initial research was to

better understand how the United States protected its citizens
from global terrorism.

The unit of measure was to be individual

government departments and agencies.
Two hypotheses were to be tested.

The first stated: The

United States government has better prepared against terrorist
threats since September 11, 2001.

The second stated: The

creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and subsequent
collaboration with other government agencies, has provided a
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higher level of governance in regards to citizen protection
against terrorist threats.
The two hypotheses were to be tested with an empirical
design examining terrorist acts and various agencies’ mitigation
and response activities.

A pre and post September 11, 2001

timeline was initially constructed to look at terrorist acts
that involved United States citizens globally and domestically.
Also, the hypotheses would further be tested by looking at
comparison variables such as percentage of government budget
allocated towards terrorism research and study, prevention, and
recovery.

The totality of damage would be examined as well.

The totality of damage was to include causality numbers,
property damages (including buildings, equipment, land and
environmental damage,) and mental and psychological costs.
During the infant stages of research and design, it became
apparent that the hypotheses were far too vast to accurately
test within a reasonable framework.

In other words, the amount

of information and variables grew exponentially and caused large
issues of staying on point.
in scope.
terrorism.

The research proved to be nebulous

Another difficulty came in the form of defining
There is no universal definition of terrorism and

using any one definition of terrorism created problems in
testing the second hypothesis.

This meant that using one
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definition of terrorism, whether it came from the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, or State
Department could dilute the accuracy of hypothesis two.

Any

definition may include or exclude variables that other
definitions may or may not.
Although the original thesis proved to have significant
faults from the beginning, the copious amount of research aided
in understanding the complexity of the issue of terrorism.
Terrorism is such a broad term that the study of it in totality
becomes wrought with challenges.

However, many different

questions and specified topics for research were found.
One such topic proved to be heavily parceled throughout the
initial research collection.
terrorism.

The topic was of “lone wolf”

The term lone wolf existed in topics of

international terrorism, domestic terrorism and at all levels of
government reports.

Yet, much like the parent term of

terrorism, lone wolf terrorism had no set definition and no set
catalogue of what were officially deemable acts.

This more

clearly meant that the line between a lone wolf terrorist act
and a mass killing, kidnapping, or attack on government was very
thin and inexact.
Though still daunting, the research focused on exploring
lone wolf terrorism none-the-less.
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The seriousness of the topic

and the lack of attention paid to it by academics, government
agencies and state actors made for a necessity of exploration.
The methodology for exploring lone wolf terrorism changed from a
quantitative exploration to a qualitative one.
for two reasons.
research.

This occurred

The first reason is again an issue with

As research was conducted, it became very difficult

to find concrete examples of lone wolf terrorism that more than
at least two government agencies and/or international bodies
could agree on as being examples.

Many would-be acts of lone

wolf terrorism have historically been classified as
assassinations, kidnappings, rebellions, and other acts of
violence.

This is much akin to the problems of amassing all

examples of genocide.

Different scholars and institutions have

different criterions for inclusion.

The second reason was

propagated by the first in that without steadfast definitions of
terms and catalogues of numbers any empirical research would be
greatly flawed.
Joining these two reasons, another obstacle became
apparent.

There was a limited amount of scholarly research

conducted on lone wolf terrorism.

This was even more grossly

highlighted when investigating domestic lone wolf terrorism.
Scholarly examples proved to be very few and far between.

Most

research was found from journalistic books and media sources.
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The sources found provided insight into lone wolf actors and
their motivations for actions.

And since these lone wolves were

few in number, they could be more readily treated as outlying
examples of terrorism.
This outlier rationale provided merit for constructing a
case study approach to examining lone wolf terrorism.

The

approach began by gathering a compilation of definitions of
terrorism from various domestic agencies and international
bodies and forming a working definition that combined the
universal similarities in each.

From there the same was done

for defining lone wolf terrorism.

After a working definition

was created, a list of all possible domestic lone wolf terrorist
actions was created.

This list proved to be long at first, but

sticking by the definition constructed in the Defining Terrorism
section of this paper, the list shrunk immediately.

As the

number of cases dwindled due in large part to misclassifications
which included individuals who were directly associated (often
through funding) to larger terrorist organizations, individuals
whose actions were carried out while they were highly mentally
unstable and those whose actions were for personal gain solely
and not to create change in society, government or other actors,
certain observations were made feasible.
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As the list became smaller, there appeared to be a loosely
associated trend within the lone wolf terrorist actors.

This

trend was that several of the lone wolves had served in the
military and used their military training to carry out their
attacks.

With this finding, a sub-grouping of lone wolves with

military backgrounds was formulated, as seen in Table 1 below.
This helped to specify the focus and to eliminate terrorists
like Ted Kaczynski, Andrew Stack, (who flew a private plane into
an IRS building in 2010) and Abdulhakim Muhammad and others.
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Table 1: Comparison of U.S. Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists

McVeigh

Rudolph

Hasan

Military Service

Yes

Yes

Yes

Extremist Views Held

Federal Government

Far Christian Right

Far Islamic Right

Over-Throw
Terrorist Actions

Bombing of the

Olympic Park Dirty

Fort Hood military

Taken

Alfred P. Murrah

Bomb, Abortion

base shootings

Building in Oklahoma

Clinic Bombings

Numbers Dead and

162 dead

2 dead

13 dead

Wounded

794 wounded

160 wounded

29 wounded

Agencies Involved

Oklahoma State and

Georgia State and

Texas State and Local

Local Police and

Local Police and

Police and Emergency

Emergency Services,

Emergency Services,

Services, FBI, DOD,

FBI, DOJ, DOD

U.S. Marshalls, FBI,

DOJ, DHS

DOJ

Another trend developed within the research as the list
diminished.

The trend was that a smaller subset of the domestic

lone wolf terrorists that were military trained also had openly
known extremist views against the United States before and
during their service in the U.S. military.
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Three such cases

were found and initial research showed an alarming amount of
similarities.
Before discussing the three case studies of this paper, it
is important to at least open up the discussion of the
psychological mindset of a lone wolf terrorist actor.

As stated

above, the proposed case study examples all had military
training and experience.

The cases should be treated as extreme

outliers, but their totality of damage and various similarities
caused a large red flag.

The interesting perspective for future

examination is to look at the psychological impacts of military
training on the lone wolf terrorist actors.

More clearly, did

military training simply provide better training for actions
that would have taken place regardless of service?

Or did the

actions that took place happen as a result of military training
and indoctrination to killing that takes place within the
military.

The former presupposes that military training made an

already pre-disposed killer more effective.

The latter

presupposes that military training and indoctrination of killing
is a primary reason for the lone wolf terrorist actor to go over
an edge and enact the terrorist plots.

While this author does

not have a significant background in psychology to dive deeply
into this quasi chicken-and-egg dilemma, it is certainly a topic
that further research must discuss.
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This being said, a good

benchmark for this topic is David Grossman’s research.

Grossman

closely examined the effects of military training and
indoctrination towards killing in his book, On Killing: The
Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society.

In

his book, Grossman ascertains that:
It is as though there were two filters that we have to go through to
kill. The first filter is the forebrain. A hundred things can
convince your forebrain to put a gun in your hand and go to a certain
point: poverty, drugs, gangs, leaders, politics, and the social
learning of violence in the media—which is magnified when you from a
broken home and are searching for a role model. But traditionally all
these things have slammed into the resistance that a frightened, angry
human being confronts in the midbrain. And except with sociopaths
(who, by definition, do not have this resistance), the vast, vast
majority of circumstance are not sufficient to overcome this midbrain
safety net. But if you are conditioned to overcome these midbrain
inhibitions, then you are a walking time bomb, a pseudosociopath, just
waiting for the random factor of social interaction and forebrain
rationalization to put you at the wrong place at the wrong time
(Grossman, xix).

This assertion by Grossman is scary and yet very rational.
Persons that are predisposed of having outside factors promoting
killing and are then conditioned, or indoctrinated, into finding
killing acceptable, even palatable, are “time bombs” set to go
off at the wrong place and wrong time.
The three cases examined are of Timothy McVeigh and the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1992, Eric Robert Rudolph and the 1996
Summer Olympic Games bombings and Nidal Hasan and the Ft. Hood
shootings in 2009.

All three cases share common variable traits

of the actors being typified as lone wolf terrorists, all having
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military training, all having openly known extremist views
towards the U.S. government, and all used their military
training to aid in their attacks.
Drawing from the original hypotheses stated above, two new
hypotheses were developed for testing.

Hypothesis One states:

If individuals with known extremist views against the U.S.
government gain military training they are likely to commit acts
of lone wolf terrorism.

Hypothesis Two states: If the United

States military is concerned about providing governance then it
will pay closer attention to past and present military personnel
with extremist views against the U.S. government.
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CHAPTER TWO: TIMOTHY MCVEIGH AND OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING

Background

On April 19, 1995 the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City was bombed by suspect, and later convicted,
Timothy McVeigh.

The Oklahoma City Bombing is primarily the

standard for domestic terrorism in the United States.

The

actions taken by McVeigh and his lone accomplish Terry Nichols
was the largest and most unprecedented attack on the United
States by terrorist actor at the time of the attack (Hamm,
2000).

The bombing killed 168 and injured almost 700 (many of

whom were children).

The actions taken by McVeigh are haunting,

but they show just how far citizens will go to show their
disagreements with the United States.
Timothy McVeigh was born in 1968 to parents William and
Mildred McVeigh.

William and Mildred had three children and

lived in Lockport New York.

There were not any significant

happenings in McVeigh’s childhood until the age of ten where his
parents divorced.

However, after the divorce, McVeigh went to
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live with William and from there his attitudes and personality
traits began to develop.
McVeigh moved to a new town as a child and as a recent
child of divorce was subjected to verbal and physical taunts and
attacks by his classmates.

McVeigh began to imagine what it

would be like to get revenge on his classmates.

He started to

develop and hone retaliatory instincts that would later serve
his purposes.
McVeigh also learned traits and garnered habits that helped
him execute the Oklahoma City Bombing.

He learned how to “hack”

into computers and was able to do it successfully to break into
government level organizations and files.

His enjoyment of

computers aided in his disassociation with other people.
able to gain momentum in his fantasy world.

He was

McVeigh also used

irrational and bold actions to try and impress others and
presumably girls within his high school classes (Vollers, 2006).
He frequently took firearms that he received from his
grandfather or from a local gun shop to school and showed them
to whoever was willing to see.
Taking guns to school and disassociating from others is not
of huge consequence but it does create a standard of behavior
and highlights his developmental behavior.

After unsuccessfully

attempting college, McVeigh Timothy McVeigh took his interests
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in guns and enlisted in the U.S. Army.

In the Army, he became a

quick learner and enjoyed the military life.

He was able to

learn about how to be a sniper, use explosives, and gain vast
amounts of knowledge on weapons (Hamm, 2000).
McVeigh did well as a soldier, but his radical views caused
issues with his fellow soldiers and superiors.

It was common to

hear him voicing about too much government control, “white
disenfranchisement” issues and so forth.

McVeigh, in a form of

retaliation, wore “white power” t-shirts on base because he was
angry at the shirts black soldiers were allowed to wear.
Timothy McVeigh battled back and forth between being a good
soldier and the want of expression of his beliefs (Michel &
Herbeck, 2001).
Unfortunately, McVeigh was a great soldier and created much
of the Oklahoma City Bombing to his U.S. Army training.

McVeigh

took what he learned in the military and expanded those skills
by learning more.

He also learned how to fully disassociate, an

emotional separation he practiced as a child, and became able to
switch his emotions off.
Although McVeigh was a great soldier he became increasingly
unstable.

His psychiatric tests for entrance into the Special

Forces showed him as having mental issues that would not allow
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him into the programs.

Subsequently he ended his military

career and returned to New York (Michel & Herbeck, 2001).
Without the structure of the military McVeigh became
increasingly unraveled.
other odd jobs.

He had stints as a security guard and

He voiced his opinions about the role of

government and the mockery of elections.

Essentially, he felt

that all the government wanted was more taxes and it would not
leave people alone to live their own lives.

He still had issues

with maintaining friends, could not find a girlfriend, gambled
too much, isolated, and became overly restless.

A letter in

1993 to his sister, Jennifer, highlights McVeigh’s growingly
unstable mind.

McVeigh wrote to his sister, talking about a

feverish emotional episode in which he became irate against the
United States government, “it was almost suicide, at that point,
but rage, but denial, but acceptance--all these feelings were
battling for control” (New York Times, 1998).
The final developmental piece came when McVeigh drove to
Texas.

He drove to Texas to show support for the Waco compound.

The FBI and ATF sieged the Waco compound and the nation watched
the events nightly on the news.

McVeigh felt that those in the

compound deserved the freedom to live how they wanted and should
be awarded for being separatists.

He passed out pro-gun and

anti-government literature and gained momentum in his own
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causes.

The FBI finally ended the stalemate by opening sniper

fire on the compound.
Herbeck, 2001).

Many were killed and wounded (Michel &

McVeigh viewed this as a drastic and terrible

action by the government.

Actions Taken

Waco was the icing on McVeigh’s disillusionment cake.

He

blamed the U.S. government for being inconsistent with its laws
and who these laws protected and vilified.

After Waco, he

bounced around the various parts of the U.S. and created alias
and identities.
for his aims.

His purpose was to scope out suitable targets

He looked at nuclear plants, military bases, and

other governmental structures.

He then strengthened his

criteria by focusing that the location should house the FBI, DEA
and/or the ATF.

Due to its size, ease of access and potential

for devastation, he settled on the Alfred P. Murrah building in
Oklahoma City (Michel & Herbeck, 2001).

McVeigh felt the

building housed the agencies he was looking to target and it had
the potential to create the most collateral damage.

As a double

incentive to pick the Murrah building, McVeigh knew that fringe
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groups had previously plotted to blow up the building.

With

McVeigh’s training, he was going to do it successfully.
To accomplish his task, McVeigh enlisted the help of one
person.

He recruited Terry Nichols into the fray.

Nichols had

met McVeigh in the military and through McVeigh’s strong
approach and quick words; Nichols believed what McVeigh said
(Rimer, 1995).
Waco.

The two began preparations in the months after

They slowly, but consistently, gathered explosive

materials, guns, ammunition and holding lockers for all the
materials.

The operation would prove fairly smooth for the two.

McVeigh had Nichols buy large amounts of materials like ammonium
nitrate, but in separate quantities and not enough to raise
concerns.
During the time of the construction of the bomb and the
readying of plans, McVeigh became bold and showed a friend,
Michael Fortier, the plans he was designing.

Fortier was a

radical as well and owned a very extensive gun collection.

The

action of McVeigh showing Fortier the plans illustrated
McVeigh’s deep belief in his cause, and the pride for his work.
He and Nichols amassed an array of volatile chemicals and
explosives and stored them in a storage facility where they
began to create the compound necessary to aggregate the largest
explosion (Romano, & Kenworthy, 1997).
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At this point, McVeigh began to rationalize his thinking
and behavior by his military training.
to kill and not think about it.
action by the end result.

The military taught him

The premise was to justify the

McVeigh felt he had been pushed to an

edge where his only ability to justify was to create the biggest
end result possible.

He became even more brazen his plan as his

created alias like Robert D. Kling and others (BBC.CO.UK, 2007).
These aliases helped him ease in and out of locations and
afforded him the ability to gather materials without evoking
suspicion.
The plan became more detailed as time moved forward.
However, there did not appear to be any doubt or fears in
McVeigh.

He and Nichols pushed forward.

On April 16th, McVeigh

and Nichols drove a truck to the site of the building.

He took

the license plate off and left a note on the car stating the
car’s battery was dead and he would be back to get the car.

The

getaway car was in place.
At 9am on April 19, 1995, McVeigh unleashed his explosives
on the Murrah building.

The destruction tore the building

apart and the north and east sides of the building were
destroyed with debris everywhere.

The bomb took the lives of

persons that worked in the building and also the lives of many
of the children that attended the daycare.
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The blast caused

shrapnel to be a main cause of injury and death to those in the
building and around the site (Michel & Herbeck, 2001).
Buildings in all directions were destroyed, burnt, or damaged;
cars and other gasoline sources caused further explosions.
Beyond the horrific death and injury totals, the economic totals
were in the millions of dollars.

Governmental Response

The morning of the bombing, Timothy McVeigh bore a t-shirt
with the Latin, “Sic semper tyrannis” meaning “thus always to
tyrants.”

He also had literature and quotes from Thomas

Jefferson and John Locke and displayed himself as a
revolutionary (Linder, 2006).

McVeigh and Nichols left the

scene and for all intents and purposes felt they had a strong
getaway planned.
However, McVeigh was arrested within two hours of the
bombing.

He was driving north and pulled over by an Oklahoma

State Trooper.

The Trooper, Charlie Hanger, stopped McVeigh for

driving without a license plate.
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During the questioning of

McVeigh, Hanger noticed a gun in the car and asked if McVeigh
had a permit.

He did not, and Hanger arrested him.

During the arrest, Hanger found evidence that would later
be used against McVeigh.

McVeigh had not been as cautious and

careful in getaway as he was in his preparations.

The getaway

car did not have a license, McVeigh was a walking quote for
radical action, and he left a business card with information
pertaining to the purchase of TNT and other explosives in the
back of the police car (Linder, 2006).
This information and the inconsistencies of home addresses
and state licenses gave the Oklahoma police enough probable
cause to contact the FBI on an urgent basis.

Within three days,

the FBI and the state Troopers were gathering and sharing
information.

They were able to link the rental truck to a

specific agency and match descriptions of McVeigh and Nichols.
They attained positive ID’s of the suspects and moved forward
with the case.
McVeigh was turned over to federal investigators and they
pressed for more information and looked for as much damning
evidence as could be found.

The FBI gathered search warrants

for McVeigh’s family’s houses and Nichol’s as well.

They tapped

phones and kept collecting on inconsistencies like names and
dates that did not match up (Hamm, 2000).
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Terry Nichols was still at large and eventually heard about
the FBI’s full investigation, which was proving to be the
largest on record.

He decided to turn himself in.

He aided the

FBI in the search for evidence and they found materials used for
the making of the same bomb ingredients found at the scene
(Rimer, 2005).
This was enough information: paper trails, photographic
evidence, false identifications, witnesses and an accessory to
the crime.

McVeigh was then indicted on 11 counts by the

federal government.

His charges ranged from first degree murder

to creation and utilization of weapons of mass destruction and
on to willful destruction of federal property.
Timothy McVeigh stood on his convictions and defended his
actions.

He believed that he had no other choice but to destroy

the building.

The government had become tyrannical and its

denial of liberty was an evil act.

On June 2, 1997 McVeigh was

convicted and was executed on June 11th 2001.
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CHAPTER THREE: ERIC ROBERT RUDOLPH AND CENTNNIAL
BOMBINGS

Background

Eric Robert Rudolph is known for bombing the Atlanta
Olympics in 1996.
1966.

He was born in Merritt Island Florida in

From Merritt Island, he and his family, moved to a small

rural community called Nantahalia North Carolina.

Rudolph

quickly learned to appreciate the outdoors and as a child played
and learned about all aspects of outdoors life.

He became

impassioned and enthralled with the survivalist style of life
(Vollers, 2006).
Rudolph lost his father at age 15 and he and his brothers
and sisters were raised by his mother.
make money and keep the family together.

There was pressure to

to help his family generate income.

Rudolph felt he needed

This reason, and possibly

others, caused him to leave school at the end of ninth grade.
From there, ERR gained a trade by becoming a carpenter.
worked with his brother for close to two years.
experienced working with his hands.
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He

Rudolph became

He learned how to mold and

morph new materials from old and gained more appreciation for
working with and in nature (Schuster & Stone, 2005).

At age 18,

he went to the Christian Identity compound with his Mother.

The

compound was in Missouri and he gained insights into radical
ideas on government and institutions.
Though he dropped out of school before graduating, Rudolph
was not viewed as anything but intelligent.

He took his GED’s

and was accepted into Western Carolina University.
for two semesters, but then left the university.
irritability was strengthened by his boredom.
joined the United States military.
training and did well.

He exceled
His unrest and

In 1986 ERR

He went through basic

His training evolved quickly and he went

from being part of the 101st Airborne to attending Air Assault
School (Walls, 2003).

During his training he learned a

significant amount of survival skills and special weapons
practices, both of which would assist him in his later pursuits.
However, just like high school and college, ERR became
listless and prone to self-destruction or quitting.
discharged due to marijuana use.

Rudolph was

He left the military in 1989.

Rudolph’s years leading up to the Atlanta Olympics bombing do
not shed much light on the character of the man or what he did
during that time.

Much information highlights his private

nature, his religious leanings and his radicalism.
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He was an

avid spokesman of the anti-gay and anti-abortion movements and
believed he was a soldier fighting in a war against abortion
(Walls, 2003).

After the Atlanta Olympics bombing, it would be

pieced together that is was Rudolph who bombed two other
abortion clinics within the country.

Actions Taken

The city of Atlanta Georgia hosted the Olympic Games in the
summer of 1996.

It was a showcase of peace and a reprieve from

racial, sexual, religious and cultural tensions.

The focus was

on athletics, the world, and the city of Atlanta being a great
host.

Eric Robert Rudolph did not agree and did not want to see

the Olympics used as a way to denigrate what he loved about the
United States.

The United States was about Christian values and

small government (Crenshaw, 2000).

He did not want to see

global socialism and multi-national agreement.
Rudolph became enraged by the Olympics.
disrupt the games.

He wanted to

He wanted to show what horrid ideas the

federal government had on abortion and how wrong they were.
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The

government was showing the world that abortion and immoral
actions were allowable and enjoyed by Americans.
The actions taken by Rudolph would not be discovered until
2003 when he was finally apprehended, but on the night of Friday
July 26th, 1996 at the Global Village a concert and celebration
was happening (Schuster & Stone, 2005).

Athletes and spectators

were listening to a variety of musical artists and enjoying a
warm summer night.

Atlanta had spent a lot of federal money to

create a venue where thousands could congregate.

As the night

wore on, the people did not leave.
A security guard named Richard Jewell (who would later be
the falsely named suspect) found a green army bag resting alone
underneath a park bench.

Jewell contacted the Georgia Bureau of

Investigation and his supervisors.
scene.

All were alerted to the

An explosives unit arrived as well due to pipes and

wires sticking out of the bag.

To add to the suspicion of the

bomb being in a bag, an anonymous 911 call was placed stating
the bag was indeed a bomb (CNN, 2007).
The timing of the call and placement of the bag were done
with an expert understanding of the surroundings.

The location

of the bag, in front of a large soundstage with hundreds of
people in an enclosed setting made it difficult for the forces
on hand to evacuate the location.
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Adding to this was the fact

that it was after midnight and alcohol was being consumed.

Most

did not care for the police and were either rude or ignored
them.

Also, the vast size of the venue aided in the dilemma.

The park allowed for many people to gather together but it
created congestion, stagnation and inefficiency (Schuster &
Stone, 2005).

All of these were benefits to Rudolph’s plans.

Jewell and others assisted in evacuating as many people as
they could out but it was a slow process.

In the span of about

50 minutes one officer was able to escort 11 people out.

No one

wanted to yell bomb due to the serious fear of a bottle neck
stampede that could take place.
it tore into the crowd.

The bomb exploded at 1:20am and

Some thought the bomb was part of the

show until they saw friends and other spectators or themselves
with blood seeping from body parts.
The aftermath of the explosion was that one person, Alice
Hawthorne, died and 111 others were injured.

The horrific

nature of the bombing was never fully realized however.

The

bomb’s original location was underneath a park bench and was
moved slightly to outside of that position.

If the bomb had

stayed in position its explosive nature would have been more
greatly realized.

It is the equivalent of having a firecracker

in the palm of a hand verses having a hand surround the
firecracker completely.

Had the bomb been under the bench, its
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explosive nature would have been much higher (Department of
Justice, 1998).
Another aspect to the bomb, one that showcases Rudolph’s
acquired skill set from the military was the nature of the bomb.
It was a dirty bomb.

A detonator was charged to explosive

material with piping that contained nails, screws, glass, and
other small items.

This created a “dirty bomb” that was easy to

build, and could be transported without much effort.

Unlike

other bombs this type of bomb did not require a large amount of
ingenuity or planning.

The maker needed only the expertise to

make the bomb, from there it was easy to repeat for use
(Department of Justice, 1998).
The bombing did do as Rudolph wanted, just not to the full
extent he had hoped.

The Olympic Games gained a focus on the

bombings and the world watched to learn more about it.
games still went on.

But, the

And an unexpected consequence took place.

Rudolph had become skilled in planting bombs and being the least
likely of suspects.

ERR was an attractive young man who did not

invite a lot of scrutiny.

In a large Olympic venue, he could

have seamlessly passed through.

This being the case security

guard Jewell became the suspect of bombing.
Jewell, a quick hero and alert guard on the scene found
that he was the lead suspect in the bombings.
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There were no

other suspects and he was being held for questioning.

The

longer time went by and the more questions asked the more Jewell
became uneasy and asked for lawyers and demanded his rights.
The world media was determined to find a culprit and have the
games go on without continued fear.

Jewell became a scapegoat

to that effect (CNN, 2007).

Days later the FBI went to Jewell’s

house looking for evidence.

The FBI took trucks worth of

information away.

It would not be until later reports and

months down the road that the government found Jewell to not be
a suspect.

All of this gave Eric Robert Rudolph a vast amount

of time to get away.

Government Response

The Olympic Games is of critical importance to the world
and especially to that of the host nation.

Due to this, the

fervor and need for results by the GBI and FBI helped aid in
their mistakes in finding Rudolph.

The focus was on one man and

even years after being cleared as a suspect civil trials were
still attempted against Jewell (CNN, 2007).

In the meanwhile,

Rudolph had long since disappeared into backwoods places and was
surviving on his own.
53

After the Olympic Games, there were other bombings.

In

1998 a bomb was exploded at an abortion clinic in Birmingham,
Alabama.

A security guard named Robert Sanderson was killed and

others were severally wounded.

A witness on scene saw a man

take off a blonde wig and speed away in a car.

The license

plate was traced and it was deemed to belong to Eric Robert
Rudolph (Vollers, 2006).
The FBI, understanding how dangerous and deadly Rudolph was
posted him as one of their Ten Most Wanted.

Being put on the

Most Wanted list did not produce initial results for the FBI.
Rudolph had skilled training and was known to be an extreme
survivalist who was acclimated in some of the worst wilderness
(Walls, 2003).

To aid in the FBI’s attempt to find Rudolph,

they proceeded to enact an award of $1 million U.S. dollars for
his capture.

This led to private search teams as well as state

and federal level search teams that looked for Rudolph for over
five years.

During this longstanding manhunt, Rudolph dug

deeper into the Appalachian hills and forests and even found
sympathizers in his extreme right wing based philosophies.
These sympathizers provided support during this time.
The manhunt that began in 1998, finally ended in May of
2003.

Rudolph was arrested in rural North Carolina behind a

grocery store close to dawn.

The officer, Jeffrey Postell
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arrested Rudolph, who did not resist and appeared to be healthy
and fully clean shaven (Schuster, 2003).

Upon sentencing for

the various bombings, Rudolph struck a plea bargain with the FBI
on the grounds that he would not receive the death penalty if he
released the locations of his dynamite and other explosives.
The FBI agreed and Rudolph disclosed that there was over 250
pounds of dynamite in the Appalachian Mountains ready for more
bombings.

Rudolph then received four life sentences for his

bombings.
The FBI and local law enforcement agencies were relieved
that they caught Rudolph and prevented another potential
bombing.

Rudolph however, saw his escaping the death penalty as

a victory for his cause.

Rudolph now is serving his four

consecutive life terms, but his actions have been shown as a
quasi-Robin Hood sort of heroics for those that support him.
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CHAPTER FOUR: NIDAL HASAN

Background

On November 5th of 2009, United States Army Major Nidal
Malik Hasan opened gunfire at Fort Hood in Kileen Texas. Hasan,
a military psychiatrist killed 13 military personnel and wounded
29 others. Hasan’s role as psychiatrist was to examine soldiers
before and after their active duty tours. It has been noted that
as the fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq continued, Hasan became
increasingly opposed to U.S. forces in those regions. He became
dismayed by what soldiers told him and took a negative view of
the U.S. fighting in these arenas.
There is not a lot of information that has been disclosed
about Hasan’s upbringing and family life. The known information
is that Hasan is an American Muslim with ancestry from
Palestine. It is also known that Hasan increasingly had ties
with radicalized Muslims in the Arab world. In 2008, the FBI ran
a search and watch over Hasan’s email relationship with Anwar
al-Awlaki. Awlaki was a cleric that appeared on the FBI’s and
other counterterrorism agencies’ lists of terrorists. Though the
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FBI found no direct connection between Hasan and terrorist
activity in 2008, al-Awlaki would later applaud Hasan’s
shootings. He would say of Hasan, “fighting against the U.S.
army is an Islamic duty” (Raghavan, 2009). It was ruled out
after the FBI’s investigation post shootings that Hasan was
connected to any terrorist group, but strong evidence was found
to support his radicalized Islamic agenda.
It also has been noted by other psychologists who worked
with Hasan that the terrorist became more and more radicalized
as time went by. He became upset at his superiors for failing to
post war criminal charges against some of the men that Hasan
spoke with. Hasan became increasingly distraught and more
zealous about United States atrocities in the Middle East
(Bender, 2010).

Actions Taken

On July 31, 2009 Hasan went to a local gun store and
purchased a semi-automatic pistol with laser scopes and several
magazine rounds for the weapon. He continued to purchase
magazines for several weeks in apparent attempt to stockpile and
ready himself (Thomas, 2009).
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By the start of November, Hasan had amassed enough of an
arsenal to carry out his plans. He walked into the Soldier
Readiness Processing Center where he worked and sat down at his
desk. He began to pray.

Eye witnesses state that he said a

prayer in Arabic then quickly stood up and began shooting the
semi-automatic. As bullets flew through the air some soldiers
tried to stop Hasan, most were killed in the process. Other
soldiers hid behind cubicles, it was reported that Hasan was
deliberate to focus on soldiers and to not shoot anyone in
civilian clothes (Barnes, 2009).
Hasan then moved outside of the Processing Center and began
opening fire at anyone he saw. He exchanged gunfire with several
officers and civilian police. He wounded and/or killed many in
the process. While outside, nurses and medics rushed inside the
Processing Center to try and help the victims (Barnes, 2009).
The blood loss was told to be so extreme that medics could not
stay on their feet easily to reach the victims.
Outside, Hasan exchanged gunfire with police Sergeant Mark
Todd. Todd stated, “Then he turned around and fired a couple of
rounds at me. I didn’t hear him say a word, he just turned and
fired” (New York Post, 2009). Todd exchanged gunshots with Hasan
and hit him five times causing Hasan to fall to the ground and
become unconscious. It was found that upwards of 200 rounds of
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bullets were found to be fired from Hasan’s gun. (New York Post,
2009).

As Hasan shot his victims he became more focused and

meticulously fired into the air hoping to hit persons, he became
increasingly aimed with his shots and used his laser scopes to
better direct.

Government Response

The FBI received its initial information on Hasan in 2008.
This was the set of email exchanges between Hasan and Anwar alAwlaki. These emails did not produce any suspected connection
between Hasan and a terrorist group; however it did produce an
understanding that Hasan was increasingly becoming radical in
his Islamic views (Bender, 2010). Anwar al-Awlaki would later be
classified by the United States as a Global Terrorist and by
2011 he would be killed.
Other concerns about Hasan’s behavior showed more apparent
in hindsight. After the death of his parents, Hasan was known to
attend the Dar Al-Hijrah mosque in suburban Virginia. It is
noted that Hasan attended during the same time of two of the
September, 11th suicide attackers. It is also noted that Hasan
became increasingly prone to depart from the topic he was
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supposed to lecture on to talking about Islam and the Muslim
faith. Also, there was growing evidence by Hasan’s colleagues
that he became more erratic in behavior. His colleagues noted
that he was becoming disassociated and disconnected with his
work. There was a growing concern in Hasan’s temperament and
character.
Many top U.S. officials including former U.S. attorney
General Michael Mukassey deemed Hasan’s actions as a domestic
terrorist action. Retired General Barry McCaffrey stated, “it’s
starting to appear as if this was a domestic terrorist attack on
fellow soldiers by a major in the Army who we educated for six
years while he was giving off these vibes of disloyalty to his
own force” (CNN Transcripts, 2009).
The FBI’s initial investigation into the shooting found no
direct connection to any terrorist group. It is believed Hasan
had no co-conspirators and that he acted alone. However, the FBI
did find that Hasan frequented radical jihadist websites that
called for the killing of all non-Muslim believers. The FBI also
found internet postings and conversations where Hasan was noted
to support suicide bombings (CBS News, 2009).
The U.S. military conducted its own investigation of the
incident and found that it was ill-prepared for any internal
attacks on its bases (DOD Independent Review, 2010). This
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troubled the Department of Defense. In 2010, the Boston Globe
reported that those who worked with Hasan knew of his radical
leanings as far back as 2005. The Globe’s reports coupled with
the U.S. military’s findings coupled together to produce an
understanding that Hasan had a long standing radicalized Islamic
agenda.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Findings

After a careful analysis of the three cases was performed
there appeared to be strong similarities between the lone wolf
actors.

Setting aside the differences between the extremist

ideologies and looking at the simple fact that all three actors
held very strong extremist ideologies there is a merited concern
over extremist persons receiving military training.

This

concern is warranted by the realization that any person at any
time could engage in lone wolf terrorism.

There is no ability

to predict when a lone wolf terrorist will attack.
There are inherent concerns with the research that must be
addressed.

The first concern is that the research dealt with

outlying cases.

Obviously the three cases presented do not fit

the average mold of U.S. military personnel.

It would be faulty

and careless to presume that these cases in any way reflect the
totality of the U.S. military.

However, the sizable amounts of

dead and injured, long term psychological ramifications,
economic destruction, and numerous other potential unintended
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consequences provide credence to further explore these case
studies.
Another concern is that of spuriousness. Hypothesis One
states: If individuals with known extremist views against the
U.S. government gain military training they are likely to commit
acts of lone wolf terrorism.

Hypothesis One, by the case

studies provided proves to be true.

Individuals with extremist

views against the government and who serve in the military are
very like to engage in lone wolf terrorism.

But, again these

are only three individual cases out of the millions of personnel
that have served in the military.

And there was no test to see

if how many military personnel have/had extremist views and
never engaged in lone wolf terrorism.

The conundrum is that

Hypothesis One is proven true by the cases in this paper, but
due to their limit in scope much more testing needs to be done
to prove Hypothesis One as a universal truth.
Still further, Hypothesis Two states: If the United States
military is concerned about providing good governance then it
will pay closer attention to past and present military personnel
with extremist views against the U.S. government.

Even if

Hypothesis One is proven false in subsequent experiments, it is
still highly plausible that Hypothesis Two will be found true.
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Aiding in the proof of Hypothesis Two is the Department of
Defense’s report on the Fort Hood shootings.

In the weeks that

followed the events at Fort Hood, an Independent review was
formed to examine what took place, what could have been avoided
and what lessons can be carried over for future protection.
report closely follows the logic of Freytag’s Triangle.

The

The

review’s title is “Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort
Hood.”

In the report topics ranged from Personnel Issues to

Emergency Response.

Page 11 of the Personnel Issue section

states, “The Department of Defense needs to understand and be
prepared for the wide range of motivations and methods,
including self-radicalization, distress over relationship
problems, association with hate groups, and resentment over
perceived personal and professional slights by others within the
organization” (Protecting the Force, 2010).
Furthermore, on page 28 the review finds, “there is no
consistency of reporting from those agents (Army Military
Intelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force
Office of Special Investigations) back to the Department of
Defense.

The lack of a single functional management structure

increases the likelihood of confusion on the part of the FBI
when it deals with DoD representatives who operate under
different functional guidance” (Protecting the Force, 2010).
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The concern is that all various branches of the military
investigations operate under their own wordings and patterns.
When information is passed to other agencies and organizations
like the FBI, it is confusing and taxing to try and decipher and
swiftly move forward.

The independent review board’s finding

and stark wording signifies an understanding that the U.S.
military must address widespread issues.

The addressing of

these issues support better governance as the aim is to better
protect military personnel and United States citizens.

Recommendations

The research highlights three recommendations.

The first

is for all branches of the U.S. military, through the DOD to act
upon the findings in Protecting the Force.

It is of paramount

importance that the DOD look to universalize its policies and
procedures throughout the department and to more closely match
that of other agencies and departments that it shares
information with.

A strong aid in doing this would be the

utilization of the National Incident Management System (NIMS).
NIM is the guide and terminology set that can be universally
applied for government agencies at all levels, non-government
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actors, private enterprises, and so on.

The universality of

NIMS allows for expedient information sharing and disaster
response.

It also allows for all responsible parties in a

situation to readily know proper techniques towards handling an
event.

In all three of the case studies provided, the NIMS

system would have been highly beneficial.
The second recommendation is for the DOD to allow the FBI
and DHS to provide independent psychological screening for any
military personnel that has been exhibiting extremist behavior
or has openly made verbal attacks against the U.S. government.
In so doing, some of the pressure that is on the DOD by the
sheer volume of personnel will be eased.

This will help to

provide more room for independent second opinions and to lessen
the case loads of military psychologists.

Also, by having the

FBI and DHS provide assistance in psychological screenings a
smoother transition of information will occur.

Military

personnel who express extremist views and are strong candidates
for becoming lone wolf terrorists will have their records easily
transmittable to the FBI and DHS.

This will aid the FBI and DHS

in keeping a closer watch on these individuals.

It will

hopefully provide alerts and red flags to better ensure that
elaborate plans and escapes do not take place.

Lastly, having

independent psychologists will help to avoid the events of Nidal
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Hasan.

Hasan’s position as a military psychologist posed the

question of, "who is watching the psychologists?"
when the psychologists are unstable themselves?

What happens

They may have

colleagues that see to help support them, having independent
psychologists provide screenings will help prevent future
attacks like Hasan’s.
Lastly, the third recommendation is for the DHS, FBI and
DOD to provide insight and training and timely knowledge when
dealing with terrorism.

As much as the DOD must continue its

efforts to collaborate with other agencies and it is imperative
that the DHS and FBI do so as well.

It is not only imperative

that the three bodies all communicate with each other about
threats of lone wolf terrorism but also for the three to
communicate and strengthen working relationships with all levels
of government, supporting departments and agencies, and when
warranted non-governmental actors.

Vic Artiga states, “The FBI

and DHS assess the threat (of terrorism) will come from smaller
cells or even lone individuals operating autonomously” Artiga,
2010).

Terrorist threats are becoming more difficult to

predict.

Creating an open door policy for all areas of

government is extremely important.

As shown throughout the case

studies, when agencies and departments attempt to work alone
their resources are limited and their scope of expertise and
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knowledge is lessened.

Security Solutions International, a

private emergency management firm created a report on lone wolf
terrorism in 2012.

SSI finds, “Knowing how lone operator

attacks are formulated requires a far more sensitive detection
system… this requires not only effective data capture and
exploitation enabled by efficient overall information
management, but also fused intelligence products.

This requires

intelligence analysts and collectors to work in far closer
union” (SSI, 2012).

Working in tight concert with other

departments will help to provide a much stronger network and
will be thwart potential lone wolf activities.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is of a reminder that this thesis is a
jumping off point for a research topic that does not have a lot
of exploration yet.

It is perceived that as the issue of lone

wolf terrorism becomes more of a mainstay concern, there will be
more scholarly contributions.

It is the hope that there is

substantial research poured into understanding as much about
lone wolf terrorism as possible.

It is also important to

examine military training in relation to extremist viewpoints.
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Though this thesis is limited in scope, its true purpose is to
raise concerns and to start asking questions about issues that
have not been strongly vocalized yet.
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